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I read Lamont’s book How Professors Think soon after its release in 2009. 
After seven years in Europe (two in Germany and five in Spain), back from an 
eighteen-year academic career in the United States, I had often reflected on the 
contrasts between the academic systems in the United States and Europe, and 
on the distorted image that the European public has of the former. Lamont’s 
book provided me with an opportunity to check on my assumptions about the 
U.S. system and with an authoritative account of this system that I could pass 
on to my European colleagues. The book is of course much more than this: 
a brilliant analytical and empirical contribution to the comparative study of 
evaluative cultures, a topic to which the author has devoted much of her career 
and intellectual effort (i.e. Money, Morals, and Manners, 1992; The Dignity 
of Working Men, 2002). The book is written in a style that satisfies both the 
public-minded citizen and the dedicated scholar. This is because Lamont has 
cleverly pushed most of the conversation and intellectual debate with social 
scientists to footnotes. In fact, reading these footnotes is as enriching and enga-
ging as reading the main text; they walk the reader through some of the most 
interesting contemporary discussions in the sociology of culture, economic 
sociology, and the sociology of science. 
How Professors Think relies on in-depth interviews and Lamont’s own expe-
rience to provide an account of how the humanities and the social sciences in 
the United States conceive of research excellence and how interdisciplinary 
panels in fellowship competitions reach their decisions. The author shows 
that decisions result from the combined impact of organizational constraints 
(e.g. materials subject to consideration, criteria emphasized, time constraints, 
sequencing of evaluations), the formal and informal criteria of evaluation 
upon which panelists rely (e.g. originality, significance), and the interactional 
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dynamics in panels. Lamont systematically examines the role played by all of 
these factors but privileges the analysis of the interactional dynamics and the 
diversity of criteria of excellence. Regarding the former, she emphasizes the 
roles played by panelists’ genuine commitment to reward the best proposals, 
their relative authority (e.g. reputation, institutions, personality), and their 
strategic games (e.g. alliances, horse-trading). Regarding the latter she stresses 
that research proposals shine differently under different lights and due to con-
trasts across disciplines in conceptions of excellence and the weight assigned 
to different criteria.
Against the Mertonian tradition, Lamont concludes that academic exce-
llence is not an objective quality waiting to be discovered through honest 
and systematic application of universalistic evaluative criteria. There are too 
many legitimate criteria of excellence for that. Against the Bourdieusian tra-
dition, she argues that evaluators are not mere self-interested strategists in an 
academic field. Evaluators’ self-concept as scholars—their genuine interest 
in the pursuit of knowledge—is most often than not their overriding con-
cern when ranking research proposals and debating their relative merits with 
other panelists. One ends the book with the feeling that panelists in the elite 
competitions that Lamont studied take their task very seriously, find parti-
cipation in granting committees extremely rewarding from an intellectual 
point of view, and attach great legitimacy to the way the selection system 
works. I especially like chapter four, on the pragmatics of project selection in 
fellowship competitions. In it, Lamont stresses the significance of collegiality, 
reciprocity, deferral to an expert’s authority and to a discipline’s sovereignty, 
and cognitive contextualization (using another discipline’s criteria of exce-
llence when evaluating a proposal from that discipline) as key variables in the 
consensus-attaining process. 
Beyond its theoretical value, How Professors Think should be of interest 
to policy-makers and scholars in Europe, as they struggle to reform the high-
er education system and make it fit for the twenty-first century. Lamont, a 
transnational scholar par excellence, knows very well both the European and 
North-American academic systems, and directly tackles this issue in the last 
chapter. The remainder of my contribution to this symposium provides an 
informed but by no means systematic impression of contrasts between the 
U.S., Spanish, and European systems of evaluation and of prospects for the 
reproduction of the U.S. evaluative culture in the European Union context.
My experience in the Spanish system rests on having sat in committees 
set up to promote scholars in the humanities and social sciences, in sociol-
ogy/political science editorial boards, in sociology/political science research 
grant committees, in social science book award committees, and in sociology 
hiring committees. In the last twenty years, the Spanish evaluative culture in 
the social sciences has begun to change toward the U.S. model, and so have 
the social sciences in general and their institutional carriers. The potential 
for conflict in evaluation situations has thus increased considerably and led 
to a certain bifurcation of evaluative processes, as organizations naturally 
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or intentionally shape committees to be more or less homogenous in their 
evaluative criteria. 
In Spain the “traditional” evaluative culture did not put research “excel-
lence” at the apex of the hierarchy of factors determining academic rewards. 
Distributional equality, affirmative action based on social class, seniority, the 
evaluated scholars’ pecuniary needs, personal loyalties, political affinity, to 
name just a few relevant factors, often superseded the quality of research as 
overt legitimate criteria in most evaluative contexts, including the granting of 
research and related awards. When research excellence entered the picture, the 
dominant criteria were social and policy significance and, secondarily, broad 
alignment with particular theoretical paradigms (e.g. Marxism, Post-Mod-
ernism, Feminism). Recent changes in the social sciences evaluative culture 
reflect the gradual penetration of a positivistic epistemological style, first in 
Economics and Psychology, and next in other fields. This penetration runs 
parallel to a greater preference for explanation over description and for quan-
titative over qualitative methods. However, except in Economics and among 
a small but growing group of social scientists that has taken economic theory 
as their model, this positivistic turn has not translated into a commensurate 
emphasis in theoretical originality and relevance and in originality in topic/
question. While evaluators increasingly reward the testing of hypothesis and 
pay close attention to the degree of statistical refinement, much less attention 
is paid to the broad theoretical and substantive significance of a given piece 
of research. This reluctance to engage with theory and substance—in the pos-
itivistic, not in the affiliation sense—is extensive to other fields of academic 
evaluation, where standardized indices of quality (e.g. number of peer-reviewed 
publications, citation counts, publication in JCR journals), instead of careful 
reading of published material, are extensively relied upon.
I can only speculate about the explanatory factors underlying Spain’s evalu-
ative culture and its recent transformation. Familism, low generalized trust, the 
dependence of scholarly communities on the state for resources (e.g. research 
contracts with which they supplement their low salaries), egalitarian ideolo-
gy, and latent anti-positivism may be relevant to the explanation of Spain’s 
traditional evaluative culture. Meanwhile, economic development, the inter-
nationalization of the economy, and Spain’s insertion in the European space 
of research and education may in turn explain some of the recent changes in 
this culture.
My considerable exposure to other European evaluative cultures, especially 
the German one, has convinced me that Spain is actually not very different 
from the rest of Europe and that, just like Spain, many European countries 
are moving closer to the U.S. system but not quite converging. Spain may 
simply be an extreme case of a European propensity among the social sciences 
to separate theoretical reflection from empirical research and to treat valid and 
detailed description and social and policy significance as the main criteria of 
excellence. Meanwhile, the positivistic turn and the simultaneous trend toward 
trusting indices of quality more than peer review and inter-subjective processes 
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of evaluation of a person’s work I observe in Spain can also be observed in 
other European countries.
In view of these trends one may ask whether a convergence of the U.S. 
and European cultures of evaluation is in sight. As with most questions related 
to isomorphic processes connected to globalization, the answer may be “yes, 
but”. Convergence is already taking place, as I discuss above, but I do not see 
European academics prioritizing theoretical and substantive depth, relevance, 
and originality in the evaluation of research proposals as U.S. academics do. 
It is this interest in theory and substance that in fact underlies the passion, 
intellectual excitement, collegiality, and reliance on rational argumentation 
that surrounds the discussions that Lamont so vividly describes. What Lamont 
may have missed in her account is that this is actually the stuff of academic life 
in the United States. University professors spend their time with each other, 
in seminars, departmental meetings, conferences, social gatherings and also 
late at night on the telephone discussing substance and theory (and gossip 
too!). In this context, they learn the diplomatic skills that they then display in 
collective evaluation endeavors. Contrast this with the sharper boundaries that 
contemporary European academics draw between their work and their private 
life, a “9 am to 5 pm” bourgeois mindset that strikes me as so prevalent in 
European academia. The U.S. peculiarity may in fact result from the relative 
insulation of North American universities from the rest of society—itself a 
consequence of the high degree of geographical mobility that characterizes the 
U.S. labor market and the relative financial and administrative autonomy of 
universities from the state.
Another factor that can help explain the greater role of theory and sub-
stance as evaluative criteria in the United States than in Europe is the more 
structured character of doctoral programs in the former. Although Lamont 
rightly stresses the potential obstacles to communication among peers in 
national evaluation contexts that result from the great size and diversity of the 
U.S. university system, this greater structure facilitates cross-national conversa-
tions to a degree rarely found in Europe. In particular, comprehensive exams or 
papers in one or several fields as part of these programs (aimed at ensuring that 
future scholars acquire command over a broad literature) contribute to create 
relatively homogeneous imagined communities of readers. Hence, when par-
ticipating in evaluative situations, regardless of geographical and institutional 
location, the members of such imagined communities can interact with each 
other in a relatively fluent fashion. The combination of highly homogeneous 
imagined communities of readers with the relatively high insulation from soci-
ety of U.S. universities also facilitates transdisciplinary flows of information 
that cannot but facilitate interaction in evaluation contexts and conversations 
about theory and substance. 
Scholarly communication about theory and substance will remain limited 
and problematic, since it is unlikely that in the near future European univer-
sities will insulate themselves from society to the extent they do in the United 
States, and since the European Space of Higher Education is promoting short 
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and unstructured doctorate programs and also the institutional separation of 
the M.A. and PhD. stages. Thus, it will continue to be easier for scholars in the 
social sciences and humanities to reach consensus and rank research proposals, 
based on their social and policy significance or their methodological rigor. The 
field of Economics will probably remain the only exception, due to the great 
level of theoretical consensus it has achieved.
Given how unlikely it is that national academic evaluative cultures in 
Europe will converge with that of the United States, prospects for a Euro-
pean Union evaluative culture identical to the one in the United States are 
even slimmer. Internal and cross-discipline contrasts in epistemological style 
at the national level get compounded at the European Union level because 
of the traditional insulation of national academic systems from each other. 
Deference to authority in European Union level evaluation processes in the 
social sciences and humanities becomes more difficult when one has no idea 
about who other panelists are and what processes have led them to become 
“authorities” in their respective countries. The same happens when it comes to 
deference to another discipline’s sovereignty, another of the consensus-shap-
ing mechanisms that Lamont describes. How can one defer to a discipline’s 
sovereignty when disciplines themselves are split into different national cul-
tures and when one is aware of the diversity of approaches to a given discipline 
across countries? The link between the degree of consensus in a discipline and 
panelists’ willingness to defer to that discipline’s sovereignty is in fact an issue 
that Lamont leaves relatively unexamined. While she synthesizes the state of 
each of the disciplines represented in her book, distinguishing for instance 
between highly unified fields (i.e. Economics and History) and divided fields 
(i.e. English and to a lesser extent Political Science) (chapter 3), she does not 
proceed to examine how these contrasts impact on the authority of different 
disciplines (chapter 4). I suspect that the more unified a discipline is, the 
greater its authority. Because of this, the problems of achieving evaluative 
consensus in national evaluative processes get compounded when one moves 
to the European Union academic field, even in evaluative panels that focus 
only on single disciplines.
Recent demands that the recently created European Research Council 
(ERC) adapts its evaluation procedures to increase the chances of funding for 
projects from underrepresented countries hints at the potential conflict inhe-
rent in such a diverse academic landscape like that of the European Union. 
Lamont’s book provides useful clues about how to include diversity considera-
tions in European Union level evaluative processes, for sensitiveness to gender 
and ethnic diversity enters in funding decisions in the United States without 
necessarily compromising the fairness of the system, as the author strongly 
emphasizes. I am optimistic in this respect. I am less optimistic, however, about 
the extent to which great intellectual diversity in the European Union may not 
strengthen the tendency already observable at national levels toward sacrificing 
theoretical and substantive relevance and originality in order to reach consen-
sus in European Union competitions. I also fear that clarity and elegance (other 
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criteria of excellence emphasized in the United States) may become victims of 
diversity in European Union research contests. This is because most applicants 
are not native speakers of English, the official language, which puts pressure on 
evaluative committees to be lenient on style when ranking competing research 
projects. In the end, methods and social and policy relevance seem to be bound 
to reign more sovereign in these competitions than at the national level. This 
would be a pity and a reason to keep on searching for inspiration in the U.S. 
academic culture that Lamont so nicely examines.
